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1. Introduction
The last ￿fteen years have seen a remarkable revolution in both the conduct of
and the common understanding of monetary policy around the world. This revo-
lution has encompassed instruments, with an increased emphasis on transparency
about short and medium run central bank policy planning and decreased em-
phasis on intermediate targets such as monetary aggregates. This revolution has
also encompassed objectives, with an increased emphasis on medium run in￿ation
targets. However, the objective question cannot be separated from the instru-
ment question. In particular, in￿ation targeting is seen as a key component of
transparent monetary policy.
At the heart of this revolution is a change in perspective about what monetary
policy is all about. The traditional perspective viewed monetary policy as an en-
gineering problem. The central banker had a set of instruments under his control,
faced uncertainty outside his control and sought to manipulate his instruments
to achieve targets. The modern perspective views monetary policy as a strategic
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Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-1021, U. S. A.problem. Most of the action comes neither from instruments under the direct con-
trol of the central banker, nor from exogenous uncertainty outside his control, but
rather from the actions of market participants who are mostly concerned about
variables outside the direct control of the central bank { e.g. long term interest
rates { but are acutely aware that everyone else is looking at the central bank for
clues about where those variables are headed. As Michael Woodford (2005, p. 2)
has put it, \central banking is not like steering an oil tanker, or even guiding a
spacecraft, which follows a trajectory that depends on constantly changing fac-
tors, but that does not depend on the vehicle’s own expectations about where it
is heading." Charles Goodhart has coined the term \expectationalists" to denote
this school of thought that includes not only Michael Woodford, but other leading
monetary economists such as Alan Blinder, Lars Svensson, and Ben Bernanke.
In this view, monetary policy is { at its heart { the problem of managing
and coordinating expectations in the economy. The instruments under the direct
control of the central bank { such as overnight interest rates { are less important
than the messages the central bank sends. But how easy is it to use communication
to manage and coordinate expectations and what are the costs and bene￿ts of
doing so? Most readings of the evidence of the last ￿fteen years suggest that it is
possible to do so and that the bene￿ts outweigh any costs. Nonetheless, a recent
theoretical literature has identi￿ed some potential costs and di￿culties in trying
to coordinate expectations. Sometimes these costs seem related to the concerns
expressed by the old-fangled secretive central bankers about talking too much.
Sometimes these costs o￿er some insights into the \limits of transparency," i.e.,
the question of how much should be made public. The ￿rst part of this paper
will review some of these arguments from our earlier work. The second part of
the paper will discuss how these arguments may relate to some current debates
on central bank communication policy.
2The type of theoretical models of social value of information and optimal
communication in strategic settings that we will describe assume away too much
institutional detail and microfoundation to o￿er concrete lessons for the design
of central bank policy. On the other hand, we believe it is fair to say that the
theoretical models that monetary economists use to debate in￿ation targeting and
transparency assume away too much about strategic interaction and expectations
formation to adequately address the concrete questions. We would say { especially
to our academics colleagues { that research has not caught up with the revolution
in monetary policy practice, and there is much work to be done.
2. Coordinating Expectations
An economy consists of a large number of economic actors making individual
decisions. Since Adam Smith, we have been aware of the remarkable role prices
and free markets can play in coordinating those decisions into a balanced and
perhaps e￿cient outcome. Each actor cares greatly about what others will do.
But in our models of perfect competition, market prices { and the ability to
transact freely at those prices { allow each actor to understand and analyze the
market without worrying about what other actors will do, and therefore without
worrying about what they think.
However, the price level creates special di￿culties. There is a fundamental
indeterminacy in the level of prices. When businesses set prices, they must form
beliefs about how others are setting prices now and in the future. How others
set prices will depend on what they think about in￿ation, and so on. When
traders take positions in the ￿nancial markets, they must form beliefs about the
evolution of short run rates, knowing that short run interest rates in turn are
in￿uenced by market expectations. Beliefs may be self-ful￿lling and - in the
absence of good monetary policy { there may be excessive levels and volatility of
3in￿ation. Thus it is no coincidence that monetary policy in particular is subject
to much commentary on how people are interpreting it, how they think others are
interpreting it, and so on. There is a large coordination dimension with { in the
absence of good monetary policy { much indeterminacy in outcomes.
Economists employ the suggestive metaphor of the \sunspot" to understand
outcomes in such settings. Suppose that sunspot activity were observed by every-
one in the economy, and when sunspot activity was high, economic actors expected
in￿ation to be high and { we are still living in a world of bad monetary policy
{ this led them to set high prices which translated into high in￿ation. Whereas
when sunspot activity was low, economic actors kept prices rises small and there
was low in￿ation. In this world, sunspot activity has no intrinsic relevance for
in￿ation. From the viewpoint of each individual actor, sunspot activity happens
to be a good predictor of others’ pricing behavior, and thus becomes an important
determinant of their pricing decision.
Let us pause to ask what features of these metaphorical sunspots would allow
them to coordinate expectations in this economy. we noted that they must be
observed by everybody. But more is required: it must be common knowledge
among actors in the economy that everyone is observing the sunspot, and everyone
is acting on the sunspot in the same way. To stretch the metaphor further, there
must also be a common understanding what is meant by \high sunspot activity" or
\low sunspot activity". If some actors classi￿ed an intermediate level of sunspot
activity as \high" while others classi￿ed it as \low", then sunspots would no
longer be able to play their expectation coordination role. In short, there must
be transparency about sunspots in order for them to coordinate expectations.
Now enter the central bank. One way of summarizing the modern expecta-
tionalist view of central banking is to say central banks have successfully taken
over the role of sunspots. If economic actors can be persuaded that it is a central
4bank announcement, rather than the level of sunspot activity, that will coordi-
nate expectations about interest rates and prices, and thus determine interest
rates and in￿ation, then here is a free instrument for the central bank that of-
fers a more predictable and smoother way of in￿uencing outcomes than actually
intervening in markets. The \e￿cacy of central banking as sunspots" requires
that central bank pronouncements acquire the same features as sunspots outlined
above: they must be observed by all, it must be common knowledge that they are
observed by all and there must be common knowledge of the exact meaning of the
pronouncements. In short, central bank communication must be transparent.
Of course, it is a little more complicated than that. The economists who use
the metaphor of sunspots do not believe that it is actual sunspots that serve as
equilibrium selection devices, nor that economic actors condition on completely
payo￿ irrelevant events. Rather, they think that economic actors could focus
on a piece of news which is only a little bit payo￿ relevant, and via its role in
coordinating expectations, that piece of news could play the role of a sunspot.
Likewise, central bank announcements convey real information that is directly
relevant to economic actors. In particular, they can or might convey information
about current actions of the central bank, future actions of the central bank and
the state of the economy. This information is relevant to economic actors, not
just in assessing the variables that are the subject of the announcements, i.e., the
bank’s current and future actions and the state of the economy, but also about
other variables, e.g., long run interest rates and asset prices. But { in an en-
vironment that is subject to self-ful￿lling expectations { it could play a role in
coordinating expectations about long run interest rates and stock prices that is
far greater than could be justi￿ed by the information content of the announce-
ment. Indeed, this is simply to repeat the main claim of the modern expectation
coordination view of central banking: central banks might be able to coordinate
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dictable e￿ects on outcomes.
This analogy between sunspots and central bank communication policy then
begs the question: transparent central bank communication may be successful
in coordinating expectations, but under what circumstances will expectations be
coordinated on something desirable { as in recent experience { and under what
circumstances might they be coordinated on something undesirable? We now turn
to this question.
2.1. Can more transparency reduce informational e￿ciency by crowd-
ing out private information?
In Morris and Shin (2002), we considered this question in a stylized model of
public communication that we will use to illustrate a number of points in this
paper. Consider a large group of economic actors. Suppose that each actor wants
to set his action equal to his expectation of an average of (i) the state of the
world and (ii) the average action of others. And each actor has some private
information about the state of the world as well as hearing a public announcement
about the state of the world from the central bank. How accurately should we
expect average actions to re￿ect the information that actors obtain from public
and private signals?
Because of peoples’ desire to have their actions close to others’ actions, they
will have an incentive to put more weight on public signals than private signals,
even if those signals are equally informative about the true state. If it is socially
desirable for actions to re￿ect the best information available, the strategic motive
leads private information to be ine￿ciently ignored. Now if the precision of pub-
lic announcements is increased { think of this re￿ecting increased transparency
of the central bank { there will be two countervailing e￿ects. On the one hand,
6given any rule by which actors aggregate private and public signals, the increased
accuracy of the public signal will improve outcomes. On the other hand, if private
information is already being ine￿ciently ignored, increasing the precision of public
announcements will just lead to more ine￿cient discounting of private informa-
tion. Which e￿ect prevails? If public announcements are accurate relative to the
accuracy of private information, then increased transparency (increased precision
of public announcements) is unambiguously good. But if public announcements
are relatively inaccurate, then their e￿ect in crowding out private information
predominates and increased transparency could be bad.
What lessons might this benchmark observation have for central bank trans-
parency? Notice ￿rst the excess reaction of the market to public announcements
seems to capture the traditional concern of central bankers that the market may
overreact to apparently innocuous statements and that extreme caution in speak-
ing to the public might be a safe response to such overreaction. And in the extreme
case when peoples’ beliefs about others’ actions are especially important, public
announcements will have a large impact on outcomes even then they convey very
little payo￿ relevant information. In this sense, they act like sunspots.
A couple of reasons have been suggested for why these observations might have
limited relevance for central bank communication in practice.
First, the negative welfare impact relies on the assumption that while economic
actors’ desire to coordinate with others yields private bene￿ts, it does not yield
social bene￿ts. In many micro-founded models, this may not be the case. For
example, Christian Hellwig has shown that when the coordination motive repre-
sents strategic complementarities in a monopolistic price setting model, the social
bene￿t to coordinated action is su￿ciently high to prevent the negative welfare
impact.
Second, the negative impact of a marginal increase in the accuracy of public
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signals. If the central bank is not signi￿cantly less informed than the private
sector about the subjects on which it communicates, then the welfare impact is
unambiguously positive. Lars Svensson (2006) has argued forcefully that this is
the empirically relevant case. Surely, the central bank is more informed about the
central bank’s conduct of monetary policy now and in the future. And even in
forecasting the economy, there is evidence that, for example, the Fed. performs
well relative to the private sector.
These are both important points. But let us argue why we nonetheless think
there might be lessons here for central bank communication policy.
First, we think that it matters whether the welfare objective is merely to
coordinate expectations on some thing or to coordinate expectations on the \right
thing".
Much analysis of monetary policy focuses on reduced form modeling where het-
erogeneous expectations are not explicitly modeled and where the loss function is
a weighted sum of the output gap and deviation of in￿ation from its target. Here,
coordination of expectations is assumed but the level of expectations matters, i.e.,
it matters that the expectations (coordinated by assumption) are coordinated at
the right level. It is clearly unsatisfactory to have a theory motivated by expec-
tation coordination where coordination is assumed. But the reduced form loss
function presumably re￿ects some intuition that it does matter what you coor-
dinate on. Remember, it is exactly when levels rather than coordination per se
matter than the potentially negative e￿ect of increased precision of public an-
nouncements arises. It is important to study further the nature of the relevant
coordination for monetary policy. There is some recent work on this topic: An-
geletos and Pavan (2006) give an overview of when welfare losses associated with
public information might be expected to arise or not arise. In the monopo-
8listic competition pricing model of Hellwig (2005) public information is always
valuable, intuitively because getting relative prices right matters more than the
absolute level of prices. Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2007) describe a sce-
nario in which public information can introduce volatility in asset prices that leads
to socially ine￿cient investment choices.
To understand the welfare impact of using central bank communication to co-
ordinate private sector expectations, we must take a position on why coordination
is required, and what is the tradeo￿ between coordination per se and coordination
at the right level.
Second, if central bank communication is to play such an important and bene-
￿cial role in coordinating private sector expectations, it must be because { in the
absence of such communication { expectations would not be coordinated, or, in
other words, there would be heterogeneous interpretations about what is going on
in monetary policy and the economy. Where do these heterogeneous interpreta-
tions come from? If you are con￿dent that these heterogeneous viewpoints have
no informational value, then no social valuable information is lost by removing
economic actors’ conditioning on their di￿erent viewpoints. How con￿dent should
we be that no socially valuable information is lost? It certainly sounds safe to
argue that if the central bank’s information is better than all the information
among private sector actors, the social loss from transparency cannot arise. And
proponents of transparency would argue that this is the case at the relevant mar-
gins of the debate on transparency. But even if this rule is accepted, there may
not be agreement on whether the central bank has more relevant information.
Since future central bank actions are crucial to forming coordinated expectations
in the market, many central banks have been saying more and more about fu-
ture policy plans. Yet Mervyn King (2006) insists that he and Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee have no more information about future policy actions
9than the private sector: \We don’t say where interest rates will go next for the
simple reason that we don’t know. And it would be quite misleading to pretend
otherwise."
A closely related issue is the revealed preferences of the central bank as em-
bodied in the forecasts it issues on the path of its policy interest rate. Charles
Goodhart (2007) notes that when a central bank issues forecasts of in￿ation and
the output gap, together with its forecast of the policy rate, there is an implied
weighting over in￿ation and the output gap that is revealed in the combined fore-
casts. Such preferences may not be explicitly held or agreed among the members
of the monetary policy committee. Nor will such preferences necessarily pass the
time consistency test.
Finally, note the important implicit assumption that a central bank has con-
trol over the inferences the private sector draw from its communication. Mervyn
King may not wish to communicate about the Bank of England’s future policy
actions, because he believes that he does not have relevant insights over and above
his explanation of objectives and current policy. But the market will make infer-
ences about future policy and the MPC minutes might play a role in coordinating
expectations about future policy decisions. In doing so, it might crowd out any
insights that the private sector might have had that it would have been desirable
to have re￿ected in the coordinated market expectations.
Or consider a more transparent central bank, like those of Norway and New
Zealand (and recently Sweden), that does seek to communicate what future policy
decisions will be conditional on the future state of the economy. Such announce-
ments may coordinate expectations about future policy but may also be relevant
to private sector assessments of future stock prices and might play a role in co-
ordinating expectations about stock prices. Yet it is surely true that the private
sector has valuable information about stock prices which we would not like to see
10crowded out by either sunspots or misunderstood central bank communication.
2.2. Is there a con￿ict between managing expectations and learning
from markets?
Ben Bernanke has argued that \when the monetary policy committee regularly
provides information about its objectives, economic outlook, and policy plans, two
bene￿ts result. First, with more complete information available, markets will price
￿nancial assets more e￿ciently. Second, the policymakers will usually ￿nd that
they have achieved a closer alignment between market participants’ expectations
about the course of future short term rates and their own views."
In other words, Bernanke argues that (1) when the central bank conveys its
own views more clearly, market prices will be more informationally e￿cient; but
(2) when the central bank conveys its own views more clearly, market expectations
may be closer to the central bank’s own expectations.
Prima facie, there seems to be a con￿ict between these two claims. If the
central bank is able to successfully coordinate market expectations, it is because
market participants put a signi￿cant weight on central bank announcements. This
means they must put less weight on their own private information. This would
seem to lessen the informational e￿ciency of market prices. To the extent that the
central bank collects information about the economy from the private sector, this
suggests that more transparent communication by the central bank might reduce
the informativeness of information from the private sector and reduce the central
bank’s ability to conduct monetary policy in future. In Morris and Shin (2005),
we formally modeled this tension between managing expectations and learning
from them, as well as noting anecdotal evidence consistent with this view.
Advocates of transparent central bank communication downplay a con￿ict
here. Bernanke would surely argue that the economic data that serve as inputs
11into U.S. monetary policy are distinct from the asset prices that re￿ect the coor-
dinated expectations generated by transparent central bank communication, and
that there is no feedback between the two. This question surely merits further
theoretical and empirical investigation.
2.3. The Precision { Commonality Trade-O￿
In our discussion so far, we have assumed that if the central bank has some
information, it is feasible for the central bank to make that information public.
We have noted that the \publicity" or common knowledge of the information
enables it to have a large role in coordinating expectations, hopefully in the social
interest (but conceivably not).
But as any central banker knows, it is not so easy to communicate informa-
tion in such a way that it become common knowledge within the private sector.
If di￿erent listeners interpret an announcement di￿erently, then the content of
the announcement does not become common knowledge. If some listeners pay
attention to the announcement, while others do not, then the content of the
announcement does not become common knowledge. Intuitively, the more one
attempts to communicate, the more likely it is that some listeners will not pay
attention to all the information, and the less common knowledge. In this sense,
there is a trade-o￿ between the commonality of information communicated and
the accuracy of that information.
In Morris and Shin (2007), we used the following example in illustrating this
trade-o￿. Consider again the coordination problem that we described earlier: each
actor is trying to match his action to some average of his expectation of the state
and his expectation of the average action of others. Suppose I know the true state
and have two alternative communication scenarios available. Under scenario one,
I could collect everyone together into one lecture hall and announce the state.
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amount of noise added to my announcement of the state. In other words, while I
would announce the true state, everyone would hear the same noisy signal of what
I said. In this case, there would be common knowledge of an inaccurate signal of
the state. But under scenario two, I could divide everyone into two equal groups
and put them in smaller lecture halls with better acoustics. In each lecture, my
announcement of the true state would be heard with less noise. But each audience
would have a di￿erent noise term. In this case, everyone’s information about the
state would be more accurate than under scenario one, but there would not be
common knowledge of their beliefs. If these were the only communication scenarios
available, then there is a non-trivial trade-o￿ between precision and accuracy of
communication that will be important even if increased accuracy of public signals
is always desirable.
There is a trivial sense in which this trade-o￿ is re￿ected in the design of central
bank communication. Monetary policy committee go to some e￿ort to ensure that
there is a single de￿nitive statement of their policy decisions and reasoning. This
enhances the commonality of understanding of what they have said. Repeating
their position to multiple audiences, o￿ering further clari￿cations when confusion
arises, might unambiguously increase the accuracy of the public’s understanding
their position. But it would not enhance the commonality of the understanding,
since some people might miss the clari￿cation.
This trade-o￿ must surely arise in understanding the limits to transparency.
Many central bankers comment that markets may absorb unconditional forecasts
of future policy, conditional forecasts are too much for the market to bear. One
way of understanding this claim is that there is a greater hurdle in attaining
common knowledge than merely conveying information to a single individual. An
in￿ation target or unconditional forecast may be su￿cient simple for there to
13be con￿dence that \everyone" is observing it, but more complex communication
strategies may erode common knowledge and { in this sense { lessen transparency.
3. Current Debates
How can we relate the theoretical ideas outlined above relate the current debates
surrounding the conduct of monetary policy? We will focus in greater detail on
one issue that we have touched upon already - namely, on whether a central bank
should publish its own forecast of its policy rate. This question has come right
to the fore of the debate following the recent decision of Sweden’s central bank,
the Riksbank, to join the central banks of Norway and New Zealand in publishing
the forecast of its policy rate. Even among those central banks that have explicit
in￿ation-targeting policy regimes, the practice of publishing the forecast of the
policy rate puts these three countries (New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) at
the vanguard of the trend toward greater central bank disclosure. The Bank
of England (another in￿ation-targeting central bank) has been less willing to go
down this route, as already noted earlier in our discussion.
The Bank of England’s position is at odds with a body of work both in
academia and policy circles that has advocated forward-looking guidance by the
central bank on its future actions as way to enhance the e￿ectiveness of monetary
policy. We have already noted the key planks in this argument. The argument
starts with the observation that the central bank generally controls directly only
the overnight interest rate. The links from the overnight rate - the direct lever
of monetary policy - to the prices that matter such as long-term interest rates
depend almost entirely upon market expectations, and monetary policy is e￿ec-
tive only to the extent that the central bank can shape the beliefs of the market
participants.
A second plank in the argument for the central bank providing guidance on its
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that long-term interest rates are determined (or at least in￿uenced in large part)
by market participants’ expectation of the future course of short-term rates set by
the central bank. By charting a path for future short rates, and communicating
this path clearly to the market, the central bank can, it is argued, in￿uence market
expectations, thereby a￿ecting mortgage rates, corporate lending rates and other
prices that have a direct impact on the economy. Having thus gained a lever
of control over long-term rates, monetary policy works through the IS curve -
through quantities such as consumption and investment.
Indeed, as we have commented already, the management of expectations is
seen by many leading monetary economists of the expectationalist school as the
task of monetary policy. For Svensson (2004, p.1), \monetary policy is to a large
extent the management of expectations", or as Woodford (2005, p. 3) has put
it, \not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current
conditions, very little else matters." The arguments are laid out particularly
clearly in a policy speech given by (then Fed Governor) Ben Bernanke (2004a)
entitled \The Logic of Monetary Policy". Here, Bernanke explores the analogy
between driving a car and steering the economy through monetary policy. The
economy is a car and the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) is the driver,
and monetary policy actions are akin to taps on the accelerator or the brake in
order to stimulate or cool the economy as appropriate given the current state of
the economy. Bernanke notes that while this analogy is super￿cially attractive,
the analogy breaks down due to the importance of the expectations of future
actions by the central bank. If the economy is like a car, then it is a car whose
speed at a particular moment depends not on the pressure on the accelerator at
that moment, but rather on the expected average pressure on the accelerator over
the rest of the trip.
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banks disclose the path of their future policy rates, there is also an argument that
appeals to consistency. Rudebusch and Williams (2006) examine the current
practice of some in￿ation-targeting central banks of arriving at the forecasts of
in￿ation and output that are based either on the assmption that the policy rate
will remain constant going forward, or using the path of the policy rate as revealed
in market prices of short term interest rate futures contracts. If the central bank
knows that its own forecast diverges from either or both of these paths, then the
central bank’s own forecast of in￿ation and output will build in an inconsistency.
Thus, in addition to the reasons arising from policy e￿ectiveness, even from the
viewpoint of consistency, the disclosure of future expected policy actions is seen
as being desirable.
3.1. Market as a single agent
There are, however, a number of issues that may give us cause to pause and re-
consider the arguments. Begin, ￿rst, with the practice of treating the market
as a single, coherent agent with beliefs that satisfy the consistency requirements
that apply to a rational individual. In referring to movements in market prices,
we often employ the shorthand to refer to the \market’s expectations". In sim-
ple formal models with a representative agent, there is indeed a representative
individual whose beliefs correspond to the \market’s expectations". In practice,
however, there is no such thing as the \market’s expectations". The market is not
an individual, and market prices do not correspond to the beliefs of a particular
individual. Instead, market prices are determined as the result of the interactions
of a large number of individuals who may have their own respective windows on
the world, and who do their best to infer the information of other individuals in
the market.
16When traders have di￿erential information, and have short trading horizons,
Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) show that the prices that emerge from the forward-
looking rational expectations equilibrium of an otherwise standard asset pricing
model exhibits the tell-tale features of the excessive in￿uence of public information
over private information. One symptom of the over-reliance on public informa-
tion is the fact that the (arithmetic) average of the expectations of the traders
concerning the fundamental value of an asset two periods from now need not be
equal to the average expectation today of the average expectation tomorrow of
the fundamental value. In other words, the \law of iterated expectations" fails
for the average expectations of the market as a whole. Such a failure would never
occur if the market were a single, coherent agent capable of holding beliefs as a
single individual.
Once we break free from the straitjacket of construing the market as a single,
coherent individual, some of the anomalies that have been raised as potential ob-
stacles to publishing guidance on future policy actions of the central bank appear
to be on stronger ground. As mentioned by Rudebusch and Williams (2006,
p. 2), one of the strongest central bank taboos is the prohibition against talk-
ing publicly about future interest rates. This taboo is attributed to the belief
that ￿nancial markets would tend to interpret any central bank statements about
the likely future path of policy as commitment to future action, as opposed to
conditional projections based on existing information and subject to considerable
change. Mervyn King’s argument alluded above rests on similar misgivings. To
the extent that the \market" is not one single individual with coherent beliefs, such
misgivings do not attribute irrationality or bounded rationality to the \market".
There is no such attribution of irrationality, since there is no one individual called
the \market" that can be the subject of such attribution. To think otherwise
17would be to commit what philosophers call a \category mistake"1
3.2. Expectations Theory of the Yield Curve
We have already seen that an important (perhaps the most important) plank
in the argument for the desirability of publishing guidance on the future path
central bank policy rates is some version of the expectations theory of the yield
curve. According to this theory, long-term interest rates are determined by
the expectations of future path of short term rates. It is through this channel
that the central bank gains a lever over prices that matter - in particular long
term rates that determine the key interest rates that determine mortgage rates,
corporate lending rates, and so on. While there is some empirical support for
the expectations theory of the yield curve, the evidence is mixed. Gerlach and
Smets (1995) ￿nd supporting evidence for the expectations theory for a number
of European countries, but there is little evidence for it for countries that host the
major ￿nancial markets.
Indeed, in a paper published almost 25 years ago, Shiller, Campbell and
Schoenholtz (1983) summarize the state of discussion on the expectations the-
ory in the following un￿attering terms.
\The simple expectations theory, in combination with the hypothe-
sis of rational expectations, has been rejected many times in careful
econometric studies. But the theory seems to reappear perennially in
policy discussions as if nothing had happened to it. It is uncanny how
resistant super￿cially appealing theories in economics are to contrary
evidence. We are reminded of Tom and Jerry cartoons that precede
1The Wikipedia entry on category mistake gives the following de￿nition. \Category mistake,
or category error is a semantic or ontological error by which a property is ascribed to a thing
that could not possibly have that property."
18feature ￿lms at movie theatres. The villain, Tom the cat, may be
buried under a ton of boulders, blasted through a brick wall (leaving a
cat-shaped hole), or ￿attened by a steamroller. Yet seconds later he is
up again plotting his evil deeds." [Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz
(1983, pp. 174-5)].
Their paper was published in the Brookings Papers of 1983, but the force
of their argument remains as strong as ever. The bond market crash of 1994,
and the ￿uctuations in the yield curve in the summer of 2003 are two of the
more glaring instances of apparent \overreaction" by the market to central bank
communication.
When considering the workings of ￿nancial markets and the motivation of
traders, the failure of the expectations theory of the yield curve is perhaps not a
surprise. Although it is very plausible that central bank guidance is the pivotal
factor in pricing one or two years out in the yield curve, it seems more of a stretch
to believe that longer term rates are determined by traders’ expectations of central
bank actions in the distant future. When hedge funds and ￿xed income traders
trade 10 year swaps, could we plausibly believe that they are in￿uenced primarily
by their beliefs of central bank policy 7, 8 or 9 years from today? Evidence from
the markets tend to undermine such a hypothesis.
Even among those central banks that have begun to publish the forecast of
their future policy rates, the markets have not always taken the cue from the
central bank’s forecast in setting prices. Goodhart (2007) notes that when the
Norges Bank (Norway’s central bank) published its interest rate projections in
autumn 2006, very short term rates fell into line, but the longer ones did not.2
2 Goodhart quotes the following passage from the speech by Deputy governor Berlo. \It
is now almost three months since the previous In￿ation Report was published. Since that
time forward rates have increased and approached Norges Bank’s interest rate path. Forward
19The expectations theory of the yield curve seems even less secure in the face of
such evidence.
3.3. Monetary Policy and Informational E￿ciency
To the extent that market prices guide real economic decisions, the informational
value of market prices ought to be of interest to central banks. Following the
recent cooling of the residential housing market in the U. S., the excesses of
the lending practices of some ￿nancial institutions to the \sub-prime" mortgage
market has become a subject of topical debate and a cause for concern. Many
of the sub-prime loans were extended in the period of unusually low short-term
interest rates earlier in the decade, illustrating the long-lasting nature of some
investment and ￿nancing decisions. As such, informational e￿ciency should be
of concern to central bankers. In contrast to monetary models based on the
IS curve that emphasizes ￿ows (such as consumption ￿ows), many important
decisions a￿ected by monetary policy are concerned with stocks (such as debt).
Stock decisions can sometimes be di￿cult to reverse.
Irving Fisher in his Theory of Interest (Fisher (1930)) gives the example of
three possible uses for a plot of land - for forestry, farming or mining. The
interest rate used to discount future cash ￿ows largely determines the ranking of
the three projects. Long duration projects such as forestry, where the bulk of
the payo￿s arrive in the distant future, do best in an environment of low interest
rates. When interest rates are high, short-duration projects like strip mining
dominate. Since investment decisions are often di￿cult to reverse, distortions to
rates somewhat further out are still lower than our forecast. The reason may be that market
participants have a di￿erent perception of the interest rate path that is necessary to stabilise
in￿ation at target and to achieve stable developments in output and employment. Alternatively,
the market may have the same short-term interest rate expectations as Norges Bank, but because
of extraordinary conditions long-term bond prices are being pushed up and, consequently, long-
term bond yields are being pushed down."
20investment can have a lingering e￿ect long after the initial misallocations.
Central bankers have a large impact on ￿nancial markets. Indeed, it could be
argued that the central bank’s impact can sometimes be too large. By the nature
of the problem, it is di￿cult to gauge whether the reactions in the ￿nancial market
is excessive or justi￿ed by the fundamentals. However, behavior of ￿nancial
intermediaries as illustrated above show that it cannot be taken for granted that
informational e￿ciency will be guaranteed. Apparent \overreactions" will be the
rule rather than the exception.
4. Conclusion
In the middle of the twentieth century, there was an earlier attempt to use trans-
parent communication to coordinate private sector expectations to socially e￿-
cient outcomes. It was called \indicative planning". The idea was that missing
markets might lead to market failures: in ￿ve years time, if the manufacturing
sector made the right investments, there would be an increased demand for steel;
if the new steel plants had been built, there would be supply to meet the demand.
But the lack of a future steel market meant that the invisible hand would not
equate them in an e￿cient way. But if the planning agency could collect infor-
mation from the managers of the manufacturing sector and the steel sector, and
publicly and transparently announce this information, then they might be able
to coordinate market expectations to a socially e￿cient level. A recent book by
Barry Eichengreen (2006) gives an overview of the process and the outcomes.
In the event, the plans did not always work as intended. Coordination was
evidently more di￿cult to achieve than this. Some of the problems of indicative
planning are orthogonal to the new view of monetary policy (e.g., the relevant pri-
vate sector entities would be large actors who would have an incentive to misreport
their private information). Others might be more relevant (would an \indepen-
21dent" planning agency insulated from short term political considerations have
performed better?) One of the lessons from the global games literature is that
when the costs of miscoordination are large, the inherent strategic uncertainty
about others’ actions entails some degree of ine￿ciency in the outcome.
The public policy instrument of \coordinating expectations" through trans-
parent communication has not always been a success. Yet it seems to be working
well for monetary policy in a number of countries in recent years. This raises
an interesting question. What is so special about monetary policy that allows
coordination failure to be ￿xed with such apparent ease? One important factor is
surely that while successful communication can reduce the importance of the cen-
tral bank’s direct instruments, such as controlling overnight interest rates, those
instruments are still there and \o￿ the equilibrium path" { i.e., if the communica-
tion policy failed to coordinate expectations { they would be used and could have
a large if less predictable impact than the ￿rst best option of using communication
alone.
If coordination of expectations is possible, then it is a powerful force for good,
as illustrated by the successes from increased transparency of central bank commu-
nication in the last ￿fteen years. But this powerful could { in some circumstances
{ be damaging. In this talk, we have tried to describe how taking expectations
coordination seriously suggests when it could be damaging. In doing so, it o￿ers
some insights into what the limits to transparency should be.
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